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COURTS-MARTIAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS
STATIONED OVERSEAS WITH UNITED STATES TROOPS
By

JOHN RITTENHOUSEt

The emotionalism which surrounds the entire field of U. S.
Military law makes the problem of the subjection of civilians to
military justice during peacetime difficult to objectively assay. The
major objective of this note is to briefly trace the origin of this
problem. This paper will not consider the recent decisions affecting
active-duty members of the Armed Services overseas and their
amenability to trial by foreign nations' courts. This situation is epitomized by the case of Wilson v. Girard.' It will not be concerned
with the question of an ex-serviceman and his triability by courtmartial for capital offenses committed while on active duty as
raised by Toth v. Quarles,2 nor will it consider the question of
courts-martial jurisdiction over civilian categories in time of war or
other national emergency. 3
The problem of civilian citizens traveling throughout the world
in close company with our Armed Service personnel is peculiarly a
product of our times. Unique, too, is the
size of the dependent4
employee "army" now quartered overseas.
The end of World War II found the United States confronted
with an unparalleled international scene. The "cold war" had
evolved. The dormant antipathy between two conflicting systems
of government became active once more. Basic defense concepts
placed our military forces in globe-girdling locations. The problems
of maintaining a large peacetime military force in positions throughout the world forced a revision of policy respecting civilians. For
purposes of necessity and morale, two high-level policy changes
were made in the role of civilians with the armed forces. First,
civilian technical specialists were employed to aid and support our
field forces. Secondly, civilian dependents were allowed to accompany armed forces personnel during prolonged tours of duty in foreign lands. These changes were made as it became increasingly
clear that the opposing attitudes of East and West were to be with
us for an indeterminate period.
Concurrent with the evolution of this policy on the part of the
Armed Forces, came the move for codification of the military rules
of criminal procedure. World War II had brought to light real and
imagined inequities in the field of military justice. The comparison
between the justice meted out by military law in time of war and
the gentler methods of our civilian courts was striking. A strong
f Mr. Rittenhouse is a student at the University of Denver College of Low.
1 354 U.S. 525 (1957).
2350 U.S. 511 (1955).
3 See, Winthrop, Military Low and Precedents, (2d ed. Reprint 1920, orig. pub. 1896), Vol. I, p.
137, "it need hardly be remarked that the mere fact that a civilian is serving, in time of peace, in
connection with the military administration of the government . . . will not be sufficient to subject
him to military trial for offenses committed during such service." The current Supreme Court opinions
seem content to preserve the distinction between wartime and peacetime control of such civilians,
holding the former (by way of dictum) a constitutional exercise of powers. See, for example, McElroy
v. United States, 359 U.S. 904 (1960).
4 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1959 (80thEdition), Washington, D.C. 1959. p. 394, Table No. 497 indicates that the Department of Defense had 91,376 civilians
working overseas. More recent Department of Defense figures supplied to the Supreme Court in 1956,
indicate that the number of dependents overseas with the Armed Services is about 250,000 in number.
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movement for military law reforms culminated in the adoption of
5
the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FEAR OF MILITARY LAW

The United States and its citizens have had an inbred fear of
military excesses far antedating the military misconduct of the redcoats in Massachussetts Bay Colony, prior to the American Revolution. 6 As English citizens, many had inherited a distrust of military
rule and justice. Military rule, as administered by the English monarchs, was not calculated to breed any love by the citizenry.
Some indication of the dominance and persistance of this feel-

ing pervading American thinking can be gained from this statement
of the United States Supreme Court in 1946:
People of many ages and countries have feared and unflinchingly opposed the kind of subordination of executive,
legislative and judicial authorities to complete military rule
which according to the government congress has authorized here. In this country that fear has become part of our
cultural and political institutions .... 7
The Court stated further that: ". . . the military 'should always be
kept in subjection to the laws of the country to which it belongs,
and that (sic) he is no friend to the Republic who advocates the
contrary. The established principle of every free people is, that the
law alone shall govern; and to it the military must always yield."8
Even with such reservations about military jurisdiction so
prominently in mind, the new-born confederation of colonies found
it necessary in 1776 to bind certain civilians to military law. Thus,
the Continental Congress said that, ". . . all persons whatsoever,
serving with the continental army in the field .. ." should be bound

by military regulations and trial by military courts-martial. This
statement of policy, largely copied from the British military regulations,10 has served as the basis for trial of civilians by military

courts down to the present.
Of significance is a case considered by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1879.11 This case concerned the plight of a paymaster's clerk in the Navy, serving aboard the USS Essex then stationed at Rio de Janeiro. Accused of malfeasance in his official duties, he was tried and convicted by a court-martial convened by the
commanding officer. However, the admiral in charge declined to
approve the sentence imposed and returned the proceedings. The
court was instructed to revise the sentence upward. In discharging
a later appeal for a writ of habeas corpus, the court said, "The constitutionality of the Acts of Congress touching army and navy
courts-martial in this country, if there could ever have
been a doubt
about it, is no longer an open question in this court.' 2
In placing the paymaster's clerk within the jurisdiction of a
Navy court-martial, the Court supplied as essentially simple a yardstick for the measurement of his amenability to such trial as could
5 10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1952 ed. Supp V). See text at note 33, infra.
6 Bowen, John Adams and the American Revolution, (1st ed. 1950) pp. 342-405.
7 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 320 (1946).
8 Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 159 (1879).
9 Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 4, at 956.
10 Id. at 131.
11 Ex Parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
12 Id. at 21.
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be wished. The determinant was simply the clerk's written acceptance of naval regulations. 13 Another case of similar fact structure a
later served to confirm the stand of the Court in this refew years
14
gard.
WORLD WAR

I

CASES

Though not directly in line with our l6asic restrictions, since the
case occurred in wartime, Ex Parte Gerlach15 should be touched
upon. The defendant, a civilian employee of the United States Shipping Board, was discharged after serving as an officer in the merchant service on board the steamship McClellan on an eastward
voyage to Europe. After discharge, he was sent back to the United
States on an army transport as a passenger. Enroute to New York,
he volunteered to stand watches. A few days later, he reneged on
his agreement and refused thenceforth to stand duty. For this refusal he was tried by court-martial and sentenced to a prison term.
Upon seeking a writ of habeas corpus, he was denied relief.
After quoting the second Article of War, 16 the court said that:
The Articles were enacted in pursuance of the general war
power, and ought to be given a broad scope in order to afford the fullest protection to the nation. The act is, in my
13 Id. at 22. The court says, "Their acceptance and agreement to submit to the laws and regulations for the government and discipline of the navy must be in writing, and filed in the department.
They must take an oath and bind themselves to serve until discharged . ..
"If these officers are not in the naval service, it may well be asked, who are.(?)"
14 Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895). The Court says, "He was therefore, as has been directly
adjudged by this court, a person in the naval service of the United States, and subject to be tried and
convicted, and to be sentenced to imprisonment, by a general court-martial...."

15 247 Fed. 616 (S.D. N.Y. 1917).
16 Id. at 617.
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opinion, constitutional. That an officer should be able to
call upon a person accompanying the military forces to protect a transport and its occupants in time of danger, particularly where he had volunteered and indeed asked to
stand watch as Gerlach had, is certainly within the fair object of the Articles of War, and is a reasonable exercise of
authority.1"
Here we encounter for the first time, a tacit admission on the part
of a federal court, that Article Two of the Articles of War then in
effect was constitutionally valid. Since this Article has served as
the basis for the much contended section of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 8 the wartime efficacy of this provision in 1917 has
some significance.
In another case of World War I vintage, 19 the defendant Mikell
was in the employ of the quartermaster at Camp Jackson near Columbia, South Carolina, as a civilian stenographer. It is hard to
imagine a more prosaic job than this, far removed from the strife
of battle and within the territorial limits of the United States. Even
so, Mikell was tried and convicted by military court-martial for
rendering false claims against the government. In reversing the
grant of a writ of habeas corpus, the circuit court made a practical
point when it said,
To hold that a cantonment like this is not within military jurisdiction would handicap military authorities, and
greatly hinder and delay military operations, and would,
in some instances, enable one employed in such capacity to
successfully defraud the government without incurring any
criminal liability whatsoever....

This provision is highly

proper, and manifestly intended to secure honest and fair
dealing on the part of those employed
by the government
20
and should be rigidly enforced.
Other cases of record stemming from the first world conflict
lend little amplification to those already considered. 2' It is readily
seen that these cases in the area of civilian trial by military courts
bear little or no resemblance to our problem of the present day.
They do, however, provide some judicial grist for the mill.
WORLD WAR

II

CASES-AN EXTENSION OF THE PATTERN

World War II cases regarding civilians add little depth to the
picture already painted by the considered cases of the 1917-1919 era.
The military courts were laboring under the same essential regulations. 22 In re DiBartolo,2 3 however, offered an interesting statement
17 Ex Parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616, 618 (S.D. N.Y. 1917) (Emphasis added).
18 10 U.S.C. 1 802 (11) (Supp. v, 1952).
19 Hines v. Mikell,259 Fed. 28 (4th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 645 (1920).
20 Id. at 35 (Emphasis added).
21 See Ex parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415, (N.J. 1918); Ex parte Weitz, 256 Fed. (Mass. 1919); and
Ex parteJochen, 257 Fed. 200, 204 (S.D. Tex. 1919), wherein it was said; "That it is not necessary
that a person be in uniform in order to be a part of the land forces, I think clear, not only upon
considerations of common sense and common judgment, but upon well-considered and adjudicated
authority." (Emphasis added).
22 Articles of War 1916, ch. 418, I 1, 39 Stat. 651; Articles of War 1920, ch. 227, sub ch. I I f 1,
41 Stat. 787.
23 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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of the basic philosophy of the American people in reference to military jurisdiction and its limitations. 24 Included too, was an intrepid
attempt to divine congressional intent.25 The denial of a writ of
habeas corpus to a civilian employee of the Army in North Africa
conforms to the pattern set during World War I. Other cases involving a ship's cook,26 a merchant seaman, 27 and a superintendent

on a contract salvage job for the Army, 28 all reached the same conclusion and denied the writ.
From the trends evidenced by the cases occurring during the
two world conflicts, we can see the scope of effectiveness granted
to the Articles of War, Article Two, 29 by the judiciary. On the
whole, the courts during both wars took a practical approach to the
problems raised by the accompaniment of the armed forces by civilians. Cooperation in the principal task of winning the war seemed
to be uppermost in the minds of the courts. Lip service was given
to technical protections granted by the Constitution, but the war
effort came first.
POST-WORLD WAR II CASES-A NEW PROBLEM EVOLVES

With the cessation of open hostilities in 1946, the world soon
found itself divided into opposing camps. As has been mentioned
heretofore, this problem engendered the use of civilian employees
of the Armed Forces and the permitting of civilian dependents to
join their husbands and fathers. The situation raised thereby was
novel indeed.
The first major case encountered is Grewe v. France.30 The defendant, a civilian engineer employed by the Army in Germany, was
charged and tried on a variety of offenses stemming from his firing
of a pistol into a crowded street. At the time of his military trial,
he pleaded to no avail that the court did not have jurisdiction over
him. Upon being returned to the United States to serve his prison
sentence, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus.
In denying his application for a writ, the district court examined many of the cases considered above, and came to the same
basic conclusion as before. In so doing, the court dealt with the fact
that the actual warfare was over in Europe by saying,
Plaintiff here argues that in June, 1946, the shooting
war in Germany was over and that the American Forces
24 Id. at 932. "It is in keeping with the traditions of this peace-loving nation that its civil courts
should not readily surrender a civilian to the jurisdiction of the military. Expediency and even necessity should not dispense with a painstaking examination to determine whether one whose libertiev the
civil courts have been charged to guard inviolate has been properly brought to justice in a mlitary
tribunal."
25 Id. at 932-33, where it was stated, "The 64th Congress made the change when it enacted the
Articles of War of 1916. At the legislative hearings held upon the bill, Major General Crowder, Judge
Advocate General, made statements which are incorporated in the transcript of the hearing annexed
to the Senate Report No. 130, 64th Congress, First Session ..
" (The opinion goes on to quote verbatim much of the General's testimony. He indicated that with respect to Article 2 of the Articles of
War, that the Army wished to include a greater class of heretofore excluded civilians 'accompanying
the army in the field'.) At the conclusion of this testimony, the court goes on to say, "These state.
ments which supplied Congress with the reasons for the executive's desire for the change and the
objects to be attained thereby are very cogent evidence of the congressional intent in adopting these
recommendations. It is manifest, therefore, that Congress deliberately intended to subject to military
authority, in the circumstances specified, not only camp retainers and not only those who serve with
the army but others who accompany it. Such persons must include those who are not employees of
the army."
(Emphasis added).
26 McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. Va. 1943).
27 In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Ohio 1944).
28 Perlestein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1945); cert. petition dismissed, 328 U.S. 822

(1946).
2D Articles of War 1920 ch. 227, sub.-ch.
51) 75 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Wis. 1948).

11 § 1, 41 Stat. 787.

MAY-JUNE

DICTA

1960

were no longer engaged in military operations, and concludes that he, therefore, could not be considered as accompanying the army in the field.
Petitioner's argument ignores the other provision of
Article 2 (d), to wit: ".

.

. all persons accompanying or serv-

ing with the Armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States ...31
Another case with a different fact situation reached a similar
result the following year.32 It would seem then, that the pattern of
cases decided immediately after the end of hostilities of World War
II placed their dependence upon the provisions of Article 2 (d)
without any question as to its constitutionality. It must be realized
that the only points of reference were cases which, although they
had been outside the territorial limits of the United States, had occurred in time of war. As the shooting war became more remote,
the question of infringment of constitutional guarantees was raised
with more telling effect.
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JusTIcE--1950

Our gigantic war effort of World War II embodied at its peak,
some twelve and one-half million men and women in uniform. It
seems only natural that these citizen-soldiers, reared in the ways
of the full protection of civilian court procedures, would react unfavorably to the harsher concepts of traditional military law. React
they did. With the fighting over in Europe and Asia, the nation
once more demobilized, and a horde of interested veterans groups
descended upon Congress demanding reform of military law.
Many a sympathetic ear was tuned in the post-war Congress,
indeed many members themselves were veterans with definite ideas
concerning reforms. For those members of the Congress without
any personal experience, the siren song of ten percent of the population, all of voting age, sufficed. Hearings were held; groups were
heard.
From the voluminous records of Senate 33 and House3 4 hearings,
the proceedings of the hard-working sub-committee of the Armed
Services Committee,3" emerged the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Code was enacted into law on May 5, 1950, and became effective on May 31, 1951.36

The purDose of the Code was to provide a single system of criminal law and judicial procedure for all of the Armed Forces of the
United States.3 7 We are primarily concerned with the features and
31 Id. at 435.
32 United States ex. rel. Mobley v. Handy, 176 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1949); cert. denied, 338 U.S. 904;
reh. denied, 338 U.S. 945. This case involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a former post
exchange employee who, while working in Germany, was arrested and confined to a military compound. Defendant fled to the United States where he was arrested. He was being prepared for return
to Germany for trial by courts-martial when he applied for the writ. Relief was denied on the basis
that the Army hod iurisdiction over him prior to his escape from Germany and therefore retained it
upon his apprehension.
33 Senate Hearings Before Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 256 (1949).
34 Full Committee Hearings on H.R. 3341 and H.R. 4080, House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
35 H.R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949); S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8
(1949).
36 Effective that date along with the Manual for Courts-Martial by Executive Order 10214 of
8 Feb 195137 Enacting clause of Public Law No. 506, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (May 5, 1950), 64 Stat. 108 (1950),

50 U.S.C.A. (Chap. 22) 9 § 551-736 (1950 Supp).
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provisions of Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code38 and its ramifications. A comparison of the texts of Article 2 (11) and former Article
of War, Article 2 (d), illustrates clearly the parentage of the Uniform Code provision. To be sure, a certain amount of expansion of
applications to civilians is evident in Article 2 (11). This might have
been expected in light of the changed status of civilians in relation
to the armed forces after World War II.
The underlying intent of Congress in passing Article 2 (11) of
the Code is well-documented. 9 Typical of these expressions of legislative intent is a comment by Congressman Kilday, member of the
House Committee who said:
I agree that persons serving with the armed forces of
the United States must be subject to military law, as they
always have been. We have a different situation now than
we have had
heretofore, with armed service (sic) all over
40
the world.
The congressional intent was again clearly expressed on the subject
during the legislative consideration of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. In explaining the bill on the floor of the Senate, Senator
Estes Kefauver indicated,
If the wife accompanies her husband outside the continental limits of the United States and outside the territories
listed in subsection (11) . . . she will be subject to the uniform code as presented in
this bill, just as she is subject to
41
the military code today.
The major concern evidenced in the testimonies of the various
interested groups (ie.-American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars,
the Army Reserve Association, and similiar organizations) seemed
to be centered upon other matters. 42 Indeed, the committees themselves seemed more concerned with bringing military practices more
38 Article 2. Persons subject to the Code. "The following persons are subject to this code: . . .
(11) subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a
party or to any accepted rule of international low, all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits °of the United States and without the following
territories: that part of Alaska east of longitude 170
West, the Canal Zone, the main group of
Hawlian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands."
Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 14, U.S. Const. provides: "The Congress shall have Power to make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces."
Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 18, U.S. Const. provides: "The Congress shall have Power to make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."
39 Supra at notes 33, 34, and 35. Also 96 Cong. Rec. 1357 (1950).
40 Supra at note 34, page 1336 (Emphasis added).
41 96 Cong. Rec. 1357 (1950) (Emphasis added).
42 Supro at notes 33 and 34.
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in line with civilian court procedures, eliminating "command influence" over military courts and generally democratizing the military justice approach. A careful scrutiny of all published testimony
before the House committee 43 indicates little, if any, awareness in
1949 of the problems soon to be created by Article 2 (11) of the Code.
Apparently, the only person testifying that voiced any real concern over the Uniform Code provisions concerning civilians was the
one person most likely to be officially involved with the Code's administration-the Judge Advocate General of the Army. 4 Even he
did not voice his criticism of Article 2 (11) but rather against Articles 2(3) and 3(a) of the proposed Code. These articles gave the
services jurisdiction over former active-duty personnel for crimes
committed against the Code while on active duty. His fears in this
regard were apparently warranted. The subsequent case of Toth v.
Quarles45 so indicates.
From this scant indication of legislative intent, we are forced
to conclude that the law makers believed that they were merely
codifying and incorporating the substantial provisions of Articles of
War, 1916, Article 2 (d). Certainly there is no indication that the
original intent of Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code was otherwise.
POST UNIFORM CODE CASES-ARTICLE

2 (11)

DECIMATED

The first of a recent series of cases in which the Supreme Court
of the United States considered the constitutional questions raised
by the provisions of Article 2(11) of the Code are the much-discussed Kinsella v. Krueger46 and Reid v. Covert cases.4 7 These cases
were considered together since the questions raised, as well as the
basic fact situations involved, were nearly identical.
In Kinsella, Mrs. Dorothy Krueger Smith was convicted by a
general court-martial in Japan for the premeditated murder of her
officer-huband. Sentenced to life imprisonment, her father sued
out a writ of habeas corpus on her behalf upon her return to the
United States. The contention of the defense was that Mrs. Smith,
as a civilian dependent, was not triable under the provisions of the
Uniform Code. The writ was discharged in the lower court.4 Certiorari having been granted directly from the Supreme Court, that
Court in affirming the denial of writ said:
In all matters of substance, the lives of military and
civilian personnel alike are geared to the local military organization which provides them living accommodations,
medical facilities, and transportation from and to the United States. We could not find it unreasonable for Congress
to conclude that all should be governed by the same legal
standard to the end that they receive equal treatment under
43 Supra at note 34.
44 Sen. Hearings before Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 256 (1949). The then Judge Advocate General of the Army, General Green, said: "Articles
2(3) and 3(a) of the code extend milhary jurisdiction over persons not now subject to it. I believe
that this is unnecessary and the inevitolle result will be public revulsion against its exercise. It has
been my experience that no matter ha,
fair and just the system of military justice may be, if it
reaches out to the civilian community, Lvery conceivable emotional attack is concentrated on the
system. This is as it should be . . . . I 1o not advocate that such persons should go unpunished.
I merely suggest that you confer jurisdiction upon Federal Courts to try any person for an offense
denounced by the code if he is no longer subject thereto."
45350 U.S. 511, (1955).
46351 U.S. 470 (1956).
47 Id. at 487.
48 137 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. W.Va. 1956).
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law. The effect of a double standard might well create
sufficient unrest and confusion
4 9 to result in the destruction
of effective law enforcement.
Considering the congressional background of the legislation the
majority went on to express the carefully limited opinion, 50 "On
the question before us, we find no constitutional bar to the power
of Congress to enact Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice."51
Mr. Chief Justice Warren with Justices Black and Douglas dissented but did not file their opinions due to pressure of time at the
close of the 1956 term. Mr. Justice Frankfurter filed a reservation
5 2'
citing also the pressure of court business at the end of the term.
53
The second 1956 case, Reid, had a basic fact situation close to that
of Kinsella. The same base line of demarcation was here drawn by
the court, with the same inconclusive results. In addition to the
contention that the court-marial lacked jurisdicion in the first instance to hear her case, defendant raised another question regarding jurisdiction. She maintained that even if the military court had
originally been capable of exercising its control, the Army had lost
this power when she was returned to the continental United States.
This fallacy was quickly dismissed as invalid.
Considered by themselves, these 1956 cases decided by the Supreme Court might cause speculation that the pattern set by the
pre-Uniform Code cases of the lower federal courts was to be adhered to. Not so.
Between the 1956 session of the court which arrived at the tenuous decisions of Reid and Covert, and the 1957 first term, there was
a change in the personnel sitting upon the High Court.54 It will also
be recalled that the dissenting opinions of the Court were not filed
at the end of the 1956 term. They never were. A petition for rehearing was granted in both of these cases. The Court thereupon
reversed its former position just 364 days after it had been pronounced.55
To what circumstances may be attributed such a complete shift
in viewpoint? A perusal of the comparison of the respective votes
of the Justices indicates a partial answer to this inquiry.5 6 The four
1956 dissentors remained steadfast in their views and formed the
foundation for the six-to-two reversal. Add to this steadfast four the
vote of newly-seated Mr. Justice Brennan and the changed mind of
Mr. Justice Harlan and the result becomes obvious.
Why such a marked change in the short span of less than one
year? The majority opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice
Black and concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Associate
Justices Douglas and Brennan, indicated that the court-martial
49 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 476 (1956).
50 Id. at 474. "Essentially, we are to determine only whether the civilian dependent of an American serviceman authorized to accompany him on foreign duty may constitutionally be tried by an
American court-martial in a foreign country for an offense committed in that country."
51 Id. at 480 (Emphasis added).
52 Id. at 481, 483.
53 Reid v. Covent, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
54 Mr. Justice Sherman Minton retired 15 October 1956 and was replaced by Mr. Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Justice Stanley Forman Reed retired on 25 February 1957 and was
replaced by Mr. Justice Charles Evans Whittaker.
55 Reid v. Covert and Kinsello v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
56 See chart l(a) accompanying.
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trials of civilians do not meet the minimal constitutional require5

ments of a peacetime United States.
The Court dismissed lightly
the pattern carefully set up over the years by the lower federal
courts. 58 The rather extended attention paid to the "tradition of
keeping the military subordinate to civilian authority. . ... 59 and
like pronouncements lead one to believe that the Court is here resting its case purely upon the foundation of enlightened civil rights
considerations.
The Court, quoting the long-recognized authority of Colonel
Winthrop, said,
We agree with Colonel Winthrop . . . who declared: ".
a statute cannot be framed by which a civilian can lawfully
be made amenable to the military jurisdiction in time of
peace."60
The Court based its decision upon the narrow confines of the
specific issue raised by these two cases. It held that civilian dependents of military personnel who committed capital offenses during peacetime were not within the jurisdiction of the military
courts-martial. In so doing, the Court adhered to' the traditional
ground rules requiring narrow scrutiny of specifics when construing an act of Congress to be unconstitutional.
57 Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957), "Since their court-martial did not
meet the requirements of Art. III, Sec. 2, or the Fifth or Sixth Amendments we are compelled to determine if there is anything within the Constitution which authorizes the military trial of dependents
accompanying the armed forces overseas."
58 Id. at A-21.
59 Id. at 23.
60 Winthrop: Military Low and Precedents (2d, Reprint 1920), 107.
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In writing his dissent in these cases, Mr. Justice Clark, with
Mr. Justice Burton concurring, said:
My brothers who are concurring in the result seem to
find some comfort in that for the present they void an Act
of Congress only as to capital cases. I find no distinction in
the Constitution between capital and other cases. In fact,
at argument all parties admitted there could be no valid
difference. My brothers are careful not to say that they
would uphold the Act as to offenses less than capital....
All that remains is for the dependents of our soldiers to be
prosecuted in foreign courts, an unhappy prospect not only
for them but for all of us.6 1
It is submitted that the minority view is the sounder, more practical one; and from a standpoint of protection of constituional rights
of citizens it is the preferable approach. The last sentence abovequoted certainly sets the scene for our current dilemma. Further
62
statements from the minority opinion are also worthy of note.
The 1957 reversals by the Court seem to have set the pattern of
reasoning for the immediate future. 63 It is not, after all, a radical
step in logic from the 1957 decisions affecting the trial of civilian
dependents for capital crimes to the set of 1960 decisions about to be
considered.
1960

CASES-COMPLETING THE SQUARE ALMOST

Four cases were argued late in 1959, with decisions delayed until January 18, 1960, which serve the purpose of clarifying and expanding the decision reached in the Reid v. Covert rehearing. 64 The
four cases concerned a civilian dependent convicted of a non-capital
crime (involuntary manslaughter),65 a civilian employee for a capital crime (murder) ,66 and two civilian employees convicted for
non-capital crimes (larceny in the first case, sodomy in the second) .61

The multiplicity of fact situations presented by the lumping together of these cases, the lack of a united majority and minority decision, and the extreme importance of
the cases, requires us once
more to refer to a judicial "score card. '68
69
The first case to be considered concerned a civilian dependent
wife of a serviceman who, along with her husband, was tried by a
general court-martial in Germany for involuntary manslaughter in
the death of one of the couple's children. Both husband and wife
submitted guilty pleas and were sentenced to prison terms. At the
time of trial and thereafter, Mrs. Dial urged that she was not amenable to trial by military court. After her return to the United States
for imprisonment, her mother sued out a writ of habeas corpus
which was granted by the federal district court.70 The government
appealed her release.
61 Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1, 89-90 (1957) (Emphasis added).
62 Id. at 83.
63 See charts 1 (a) and 1 (b) accompanying for comparison.
64 Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
615Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S . (1960).
66 Grisham v. Hagan 361 U.S. . (1960).
67 McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo and Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S .....
(1960).
68 Chart 1 (b) accompanying.
69 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
(1960).
70 United States ex rel. Singleton v. Kinsella, 164 F. Supp. 707 (SD W. Va. 1958).
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The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Clark, places great
reliance upon the authority of the 1957 cases.7 1 The opinion states:
In the second Covert case, each opinion supporting the
judgment struck down the article (Article 2(11), UCMJ)
as it was applied to civilian dependents charged with capital crimes ....

The briefs and argument in Covert reveal

that it was argued and submitted by the parties on the theory that no constitutional distinction could be drawn between capital and noncapital offenses for the purposes of
Clause 14.72
It can thus be seen that all concerned, the court and government
counsel, had begun in 1957 to spin a fine web of theory which could
ultimately result in but one logical result: the complete banishment
of court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2 (11) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice for civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas either as dependents or as employees of the armed
forces during peacetime.
The majority opinion here drew a distinction between jurisdiction of courts-martial for capital crimes but not for noncapital
crimes. The Court pointed out that in so doing, there would be
placed in the hands of the military an ability, under guise of mercy, to reduce the crime charged from capital to noncapital73 and
thereby retain jurisdiction which would otherwise be lacking.
The Court quoted Toth v Quarles74 as to the effect to be given
to the interpretation of Article One, Section Eight, Clause 14 of the
United States Constitution. The Court indicated its continuing approval of such a criteria, namely, that of "status". In further defending the majority view concerning the determinant "status", the
court said:
But the power to 'make Rules for the government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces' bears no limitation as to offenses. The power there granted includes not
only the creation of offenses but the fixing of punishment
therefor. If civilian dependents are included in the term
'land and naval forces' at all, they are subject to the full
power granted the Congress therein to create capital as well
as noncapital offenses. This Court cannot diminish and expand that power, either on a case-by-case basis or on a balancing of the power there granted Congress against the
safeguards of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Due process cannot create or enlarge power. 75
This "status" test was not concurred in by two of the justices.
Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring, said in dissent, that the proper distinction was a test of capital crime versus
noncapital crime as committed by a civilian with the armed forces
overseas. 7 6 In the former instance, any civilian regardless of his
"status" should be exempt from trial under Article 2 (11). In the
latter case, according to the dissent, any civilian with the armed
71 Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
72 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
(1960).
73 Id. at
(Emphasis added).
74350 U.S. 11 (1955).
(1960). (Emphasis added).
75 Kinsella v. Unitde States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
76 Concurring and dissenting opinions, McKlroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo; Wilson v.
Bohlender; Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton; and Grisham v. Hagan. 361 U.S..--- (1960).
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forces overseas should be amenable to trial by courts-martial. One
specific criticism of the "status" test was leveled by Justice Harlan
as follows:
I revert to the Court's "status" approach to the power of
Congress to make rules for governing the armed forces.
How little of substance that view holds appears when it is
pointed out that had those involved in these cases been inducted into the army, though otherwise maintaining their
same capacities, it would presumably have been held that
they were all fully subject to Article 2 (11). Yet except for
their real "status" would have remained the
this formality
77
same.
In this seven-to-two decision, we are confronted with a highly
78
anomalous situation. The majority pays lip service to due process.
Yet the end result of this decision is to allow Mrs. Dial, one of the
defendants, her freedom, while her soldier husband serves out a
maximum sentence for the very same crime. The difference is
"status". I submit that such a double standard is more repugnant
to the American sense of due process than any trial of a civilian under Article 2 (11).
The second opinion of the 1960 series concerning Article 2 (11)
is a consolidation of two cases.79 These cases analyze the problem
of noncapital offenses committed by civilian employees of the armed
services overseas.
The Guagliardo case involved an electrical lineman at a North
African air base who was court-martialed and convicted on charges
of larceny and conspiracy to commit larceny. Upon commencement
of habeas
of his sentence in the United States, he filed for a writ
corpus. The district court dismissed his application, ° the court of
appeals reversed and ordered the respondent dismissed."' The government appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court.
The Wilson case concerned a civilian auditor working for the
Army in Berlin. He was convicted by a general courts-martial on a
guilty plea on three counts of sodomy. Upon arrival in the United
States, he also applied for a habeas corpus writ, which was granted,82 and appealed by the government.
. (Emphasis added).
77 Id. at
78 I. at 304-05, wherein the Court says, "Neither our history nor our decisions furnish a foothold
for the application of such due process concepts as the Government projects."
(1960).
79 McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo and Wilson v. Bohlender 361 U.S.
80 158 F. Supp. 171 (DC Wash DC 1958).
81 259 F.2d 927, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 112 (Ct. App D.C. 1959).
82 167 F. Supp. 791 (DC-Colo. 1958).
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Two new dissenters, Mr. Justice Whittaker and Mr. Justice
Stewart, in application to civilian employees only, expresses the
opinion that such employees are of such "status" as to be amenable
to trial by courts-martial overseas in time of peace. Mr. Justice
Whittaker, in writing the dissent indicated:
There is a marked and clear difference between civilian
dependents 'accompanying the armed forces' and 'civilian
persons' serving with (or) employed by the armed forces
at military posts in foreign lands. The latter are engaged
in purely military work ....
These civilian employees thus
perform essential services for the military and, in doing so,
are subject to the orders, direction and control of the same
military command as the "members" of those forces; and,
not infrequently, members of those forces who are assigned
to work with and assist those employees are subject to their
direction and control. . . . They are so intertwined with
those forces and military communities as to be in every
practical sense an integral part of them. On the other hand,
civilian dependents 'accompanying the armed forces' perform no services for those forces, present dissimilar security
and disciplinary problems, have only a few of the military
privileges and generally stand in a very different relationship to those forces than do the civilian employees .... 83
The two dissentors felt that the powers granted by Article One,
Section Eight, Clause 14, of the United States Consitution, enabled
the Congress to regulate such civilian personnel. The conclusion
reached by the majority was erroneous, said the dissent, since:
(I) t would seem clear enough that Congress could rationally find that those persons are "in" those forces and, though
there be no shooting war, that those forces, in turn, are "in
the field"; and hence Congress could and did constitutionally make those employees subject to the military power.
Both the practical necessities and the lack of alternatives,
shown so clearly by Mr. Justice Clark in the Covert case
(citations omitted), strongly buttress
this conclusion, if, in84
deed, it could otherwise be doubted.
Therefore we see injected into the problem of the jurisdictional
validity of Article 2 (11) of the Code still another philosophy. The
current tests of validity and the supreme court advocates of each
have set forth their views. One more case remains to be considered.
The final case for consideration in this current judicial "ring
cycle" is that of Grisham v. Hagen.8 5 Concerned here is the plight
of a civilian employee of the Army stationed in France accused of
the unpremeditated murder of his wife. He was tried and convicted
by a general courts-martial acting under the authority of Article 2
(11). Brought back to the continental United States to serve his
thirty-five year sentence, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus.
The district court dismissed his application86 and the court of appeals affirmed the denial.8 7 He thereupon appealed to the Supreme
Court.
83 McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo, and Wilson v. Bohlender 361 U.S.
84 Id.

at. (Emphasis

added).

85 361 U.S ... (1960).
86 161 F. Supp. 112 (DC MD Penna 1958).
87 261 F.2d 204 (U.S. C App-3d Cir. 1958).

(1960).
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The Court, in overthrowing the decisions of the lower federal
courts, utilized the standards outlined for the other 1960 cases here
considered. Since this case involved a civilian employee accused of
a capital crime, an application of the standards set forth by the
various justices resulted in a seven-to-two reversal with Mr. Justice
Stewart and Mr. Justice Whittaker dissenting. The dissent, in applying the obverse side of the "status' coin, would hold a civilian
employee overseas amenable to trial by courts-martial for any offense.
The majority of the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clark,
indicate that they felt the 1957 Reid v. Covert8s decision to be controlling. Applying the principal determinant of the distinction
formed between capital and noncapital crimes, the court said:
(T) he considerations pointed out in Covert have equal applicability here ....

(we) there held that the death penalty

is so irreversable that a dependent charged with a capital
crime must have the benefit of a jury. The awesomeness of
the death penalty has no less impact when applied to civilian employees. Continued adherence to Covert requires
civilian
employees to be afforded the same right of trial by
89
jury.

Having thus anchored their reasoning to 1957, the majority went on
to grant Mr. Grisham his freedom.
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

The recent series of cases considered here90 indicate that the
provisions of Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code have been virtually eliminated for peacetime application to civilians. One question
that then immediately confronts the military is how to fill the
vacuum of policy thus created concerning criminal jurisdiction over
civilians stationed with the armed forces overseas? Or has there
been a vacuum created at all?
Whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of
Forces Agreements9" will still cover civilian personnel stationed
within the various host nations is to be doubted in the light of these
1960 decisions. The NATO Agreement defines 'civilian component'
as: ".

.

. the civilian personnel accompanying a force of a contract-

ing Party who are in the employ of an armed service of that contracting Party, and who are not stateless persons, nor nationals of
any State which is not a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, nor nationals of, 92
nor
- ordinarily resident in, the States in which the force
is located.
It would seem then, that the NATO Agreements envisaged only
such categories of civilians traveling with the forces of a sending
88354 U.S. 1 (1957).
89 Grisham v. Hogan, 361 U.S.
(1960). The Court continues its pronouncement with a puzzling
statement that: "..... Furthermore, the number of civilian employees is much smaller than the number
of dependents, and the alternative Procedures available For controlling discipline as to the former
more effective." (Emphasis added). Query: How much substance and validity do either of these contentions have? Just how effective are these "alternative procedures" available for controlling discipline, and, for that matter, what are they? Has the Court attempted here to equate constitutional
protection with the number of persons involved?
90 McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo and Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S.
(1960); Grishom
v. Hogan, 361 U.S.. (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S .....
(1960).
91 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding The Status of Their Forces,
June 19, 1951; 4 U.S. Treaties & Other International Agreements 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (effective
August 23, 1953).
92 Id. Art. 1, para. 1 (a).
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nation as would already be amenable to the military jurisdiction of
with the provisions of our administrathat sending nation. So also
tive agreement with Japan 93 covering virtually the same provisions
of criminal jurisdiction as does the NATO Agreement. Scrutiny of
the provisions of the agreements between the United States and the
nations basing a major portion of these civilians and comparison
with the tendency of the recent cases as regards such civilians, indicates a possible pattern. It seems likely that the other nations involved could logically reason that such civilians, be they dependents
or employees, will have the same status as any tourist traveling
within that nation and committing a crime against the local regulations.
These agreemerits set forth minimal standards or guarantees to
safeguard the procedural rights of any person tried under them. A
comparison of the rights guaranteed to Americans under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the NATO Agreements reveals that:
The Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for
Courts-Martial contain all of the safeguards guaranteed by
paragraph 9 of Article VII of the agreement. The code, however, contains the following additional safeguards not
guaranteed by the agreement:
1. A prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination
(art. 31, UCMJ) which is comparable to the provision in
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself";
2. A prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
(art. 55, UCMJ) which is comparable to the provision in
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution that there shall
not be inflicted "cruel and unusual punishment"; and
3. A prohibition against introduction of illegally obtained evidence (MCM, para. 152) which is comparable to
the provision in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution that the right of the people "against" unreasonable
searches and seizures * * * shall not be violated ..... 94
93 Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security
Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, Spt. 29, 1953; 4 U.S. Treaties & Other International Agreements 1846, T.I.A.S. No. 2848.
94 Hearings to Review Operation of Article VII of the Agreement Between The Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 272 (1955).
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The results of this comparison are such as to make it obvious to
even the casual observer that the Uniform Code hews closer to the
line of Constitutional safeguards than does the NATO Agreement.
If such be the case, can it be doubted that it is preferable to be subjected to the requirements of the Uniform Code? Such doubt is apparently evidenced by the Supreme Court.
Since legal writers9 5 and hearings before the Congress9" indicate that there is a direct relationship between the agreements with
foreign nations regarding the scope of their jurisdiction over American military regulated personnel and the guarantees set forth under the Uniform Code, it seems logical to assume that the two would
be difficult to divorce from each other. Yet this is the virtual effect
of the decisions rendered by the court in the field of civilians accompanying the armed forces. Without the foundation of the Uniform Code provisions upon which to lay our reasoning, we have no
alternative but to look to other possibilities of a workable solution.
As was pointed out by Mr. Justice Clark in the 1956 cases, 7 the
provisions of the Code compare favorably with the most advanced
criminal codes of procedure in existence. Certainly the workings of
the Uniform Code are subjected to more substantive and procedural
reviews, both military and civilian, than any other criminal proceedings in the world including our own domestic courts. A cursory
reference to the cases hereip cited should offer ample proof of this.
In considering the plight of the many civilian dependents and
possible methods of now dealing with their criminal infractions,
several possibilities present themselves. They may be enumerated
as follows:
1. The military has the power to forbid the billeting overseas
of this category of civilian.
2. The Congress may make provision for a trial court set up
which would travel the overseas 'circuit'.
3. The military may continue to permit civilian dependents to
accompany their armed services relatives without the protection of
any United States-administered criminal procedure.
95 E.D. Re, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement, printed in Hearings on H.J. Res. 309 and Similar
Measures Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 509-t10, as
follows:
"Sound legal analysis, therefore, would require the conclusion that although a certain immunity
exists for foreign visiting forces, the extent of the immunity is strictly a matter of agreement (Emphasis
added.) It is for the territorial sovereign to determine the extent to which he wishes to waive the
exercise of his jurisdiction. The agreements actually entered into by the nations of the world, and the
decided coses clearly demonstrate that the problem has always involved reconciling "the practical
necessities of the situation with a proper respect for nalonal sovereignty." Predicated upon the foregoing legal analysis, it is apparent that the contention that, in absence of the agreement, the NATO
countries would have no jurisdiction over American forces stationed there is completely untenable .. "
96 Id. at 1043, "the most important of these jurisdictional arrangements are contained in article VII
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement, now in force in most NATO
nations, and article XVII of the Japanese Administrative Agreement ..
" Id. at 1050 "International
law, as reflected in the cases and in the working arrangements, does not appear to support the view
that, in absence of an agreement, the United States would be able to exercise exclusive criminal
the NATO and Japanese agreements require
jurisdiction over its overseas forces.... ""Although
foreign courts to grant certain safeguards to American defendants, they do not guarantee all the constitutional safeguards afforded to defendant in federal or state criminal trials. Most of the countries
in which members of American armed forces are being tried do not provide by their internal law for
such safeguards. The agreements would seem open to criticism, HOWEVER, ONLY IF THEY FAIL TO
REQUIRE SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEED TO DEFENDANTS IN COURTS-MARTIAL. (Emphasis added). Therefore the extent to which constitutional guarantees apply to courts-martial must be determined before
it can be decided whether a failure to assure traditional safeguards affects the constitutionality of the
agreements."
97 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 478 (1956).
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4. The military may require, as a condition precedent to their
transportation overseas, the signing of a waiver making such dependents once more amenable to the Code.
5. The government may make provision for the return of any
civilian offender to the continental limits of the United States for
trial by a federal court.
It is quite evident at this juncture, that all of the possibilities
contain the seeds of their own destruction. In the first instance, although it is quite evident that the military has the power to prevent
civilian dependents from going overseas as a family unit, such
policy change would place the armed services at precisely the
same disadvantage morale-wise, as they were at the end of World
War II. Since this decision came from the highest level, presumably
there was ample and substantial reason for its institution and substantial reason for its continuance.
The second proposal presents multitudinous problems of policy
factors. Individual treaties would have to be negotiated with each
nation involved, providing for a United States court to exercise jurisdiction on foreign soil. Certainly it would not be unrealistic to envision a request for reciprocity. And should such treaties be successfully negotiated, in what manner would we derive a jury? The
expenses involved would be secondary to the procedural confusion.
The third possibility seems to be, at present, the most likely.
It requires no action at all on the part of any branch of the government. The losers can take comfort in the fact that they are serving
prison terms in foreign lands to engender a greater understanding
of the protections of the United States Constitution.
The fourth possibility, if required, would be certain for a speedy
test before the Supreme Court. Also arising herein would be the
same morale factor cited above.
The fifth possibility would involve such problems as the ability
to obtain foreign witnesses and transport them hither, to keep them
within the jurisdiction of the court for the requisite period of trial,
to allow the jury to see the scene of the crime if that were deemed
necessary by the defense and court, and many more factors which
would pique the imagination of a good defense counsel.
None of these counter proposals put forth as replacements for
the now banished provisions of the Code would seem workable.
How do we now provide for the orderly workings of any criminal
regulations with regard to such civilian dependents? The Court
seems to believe that the way will be found. The pertinent question
seems to be, at present, how do we provide for the punishment of a
premeditated murder at an overseas base perpetrated by a civilian
American and involving only American personnel? To believe that
a foreign court would entertain jurisdiction in such a matter, certain to become an international cause celebre, is to fly in the face
of reality.
What of the category of civilian employees of the armed forces?
Can we say with any more assurance that these persons, with the
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court-accorded "status" of civilians will be treated in any lesser
manner? It seems unlikely that such would be the case under the
rationale of the majority decisions in the 1960 cases.9 8
Semantically, the "status" argument put forth by the majority
of the Court may have validity. Theoretically, the constitutional
safeguards concept invoked by the majority may have validity.
When viewed in the glaring light of possible alternative measures
to insure the administration of justice for all, the better reasoned
view appears to lie with the slim majority of the 1956 cases. 9
98 Cases cited in Note 90, Supro.
99 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 1 (1957).
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